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NO NEED TO BREAK NEW GROUND:  
A RESPONSE TO THE SUPREME  
COURT’S THREAT TO OVERHAUL THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Jennifer L. Pomeranz* 
        Commercial speech and core speech are fundamentally different, 
and the basis for their current First Amendment protections reflects this 
understanding. The purpose for protecting each type of speech is 
unique, and the ability of the government to compel or restrict such 
speech differs. Two distinct analytical frameworks and two different 
tiers of protection have emerged. 
        The U.S. Supreme Court has afforded protection against 
unwarranted restriction of commercial speech by applying intermediate 
scrutiny under the test that it established in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. On the other hand, the 
Court has subjected regulations of core speech to strict scrutiny. 
However, in 2011, the Court conflated the two analyses and relied on 
core-speech precedent when it analyzed a commercial-speech issue in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 
        This Article argues that the Court must uphold the distinction 
between commercial speech and core speech and that it must reject all 
future opportunities to overhaul the commercial-speech doctrine. The 
Court should continue using the Central Hudson test to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to challenged regulations of commercial speech. 
Further, this Article encourages the Court to better define the 
intermediate scrutiny standard that Central Hudson set forth by 
clarifying the second, third, and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson 
test. Such clarification will encourage more consistency in lower 
courts’ opinions in the realm of commercial speech. 
 
 * Director of Legal Initiatives at the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity at Yale 
University; B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Cornell Law School; M.P.H., Harvard School of 
Public Health. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not upheld a commercial speech 
restriction since 1995.
1
 In its most recent opportunity, the Court 
found that the statute at issue in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
2
 
“hampered” at least some commercial speech, and it struck down the 
law as violating the First Amendment.
3
 The majority threatened 
stricter review but subjected the law to “a commercial speech 
inquiry” because “the outcome is the same whether a special 
commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is 
applied.”
4
 However, even accepting the majority’s view that the law 
implicated the First Amendment,
5
 the majority departed from 
precedent establishing the commercial speech doctrine and 
confusingly infused core speech cases within its proposed 
commercial speech analysis. 
IMS Health did not present the Court with a typical commercial 
speech restriction, and the majority did not employ a traditional 
commercial speech analysis. The dissent would have subjected the 
regulation to rational basis review but alternatively found that it 
should have passed First Amendment scrutiny.
6
 Prior to IMS Health, 
the Court had not granted certiorari on a case assessing the 
constitutionality of a commercial speech restriction since 
 
 1. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a state bar rule that 
imposed a thirty-day ban on targeted direct mail solicitations of persons involved in personal 
injury or wrongful death actions). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (describing a Vermont law that restricted the sale, disclosure, and 
use of pharmacy records containing prescriber-identifiable information for purposes of marketing 
or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consented). 
 3. Id. at 2659, 2667. 
 4. Id. at 2664, 2667 (explaining that “heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted” and citing 
both core and commercial speech cases, but then stating: “As in previous cases, however, the 
outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial 
scrutiny is applied. For the same reason there is no need to determine whether all speech 
hampered by § 4631(d) is commercial, as our cases have used that term” (citations omitted)); see 
also Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing Data for 
Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1250 (2011) (“The term ‘heightened scrutiny’ is 
critical and pointedly ambiguous. It might be a mere synonym for the midlevel scrutiny applied 
under the Central Hudson test—but it might mean far more.”). 
 5. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority 
deviated from precedential standards and that commercial speech is held to a more lenient 
standard than core speech). 
 6. Id. at 2674–77. 
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Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,
7
 decided in 2002. In 
Thompson, the majority struck down the regulation under the 
intermediate test developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission
8
 for restrictions on commercial 
speech.
9
 The dissent would have upheld the restriction under the 
same test.
10
 Justice Thomas concurred separately to express his long-
held view that restrictions on commercial speech “should not be 
analyzed under the Central Hudson test.”
11
 He has and continues to 
be the biggest proponent of applying strict scrutiny to all regulations 
of speech.
12
 
In Thompson, as in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
13
 decided 
one year earlier, the Court acknowledged that not all the Justices 
have embraced the Central Hudson test and its application to 
commercial speech restrictions as a whole.
14
 Parties challenging 
 
 7. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 8. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 9. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368. In the same year that the Court decided Thompson, it denied 
certiorari for a case assessing the constitutionality of a commercial disclosure requirement; 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Borgner v. 
Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002). They opined that the case would have provided “an 
excellent opportunity to clarify some oft-recurring issues in the First Amendment treatment of 
commercial speech and to provide lower courts with guidance on the subject of state-mandated 
disclaimers.” Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). But in 2010, the Court accepted and decided a 
commercial disclosure case, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 
1341 (2010), where the full court upheld the disclosure requirements as constitutional based on 
precedent established in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Justice 
Thomas concurred separately to question the commercial speech doctrine in general and as 
applied in that case. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1342–45 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 10. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 378–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joining in the dissent were Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg). 
 11. Id. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 12. Justice Thomas has been the most outspoken about his disagreement with the 
commercial speech doctrine. Ironically, he wrote the majority opinion, applying the Central 
Hudson test, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), and joined the majority in one 
of the very few cases where the Court upheld a commercial speech restriction under the Central 
Hudson test, Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995). Justice Stevens, who 
expressed anti–Central Hudson views, joined the dissent. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 635 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (joining in the dissent were Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg). Justice Scalia 
has since tempered his anti–Central Hudson views. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since I do not believe we have before us the 
wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to 
replace it—I must resolve this case in accord with our existing jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 13. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 14. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367–68; Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (“Petitioners urge us to reject 
the Central Hudson analysis and apply strict scrutiny. They are not the first litigants to do so. 
Admittedly, several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson 
analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases.” (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. 
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commercial speech restrictions on First Amendment grounds often 
urge the Court to reject Central Hudson in favor of strict scrutiny 
based on this disagreement.
15
 Thus far, however, the Court has not 
explicitly found any case to require it to depart from Central Hudson 
and “break new ground.”
16
 IMS Health followed this pattern. 
In IMS Health, the respondents cited the “collection of opinions” 
questioning Central Hudson for the proposition that a “majority of 
current justices have suggested that all laws suppressing the content 
of speech should be subjected to strict scrutiny, even when the 
speech could be classified as ‘commercial.’”
17
 Commercial entities 
seek strict scrutiny application to restrictions and compulsions of 
commercial communication in order to have wider ability to 
communicate without government interference. However, the impact 
of such a radical transformation of the commercial speech doctrine 
would be detrimental to consumers and directly contravenes the 
Court’s original purpose for finding that the First Amendment 
protects commercial speech. Further, applying strict scrutiny to 
commercial speech is not a straightforward proposition. There are a 
wide range of implications that would result from the Court 
retreating from intermediate scrutiny. 
This Article argues that the Court should never find it 
appropriate to “break new ground” and overhaul the commercial 
speech doctrine to provide commercial speech with enhanced First 
Amendment protection. The outcome of judicial interpretation 
should not always be “the same whether” commercial speech is 
involved “or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is” necessary because 
core speech is implicated.
18
 There are fundamental differences 
 
Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999); id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501, 510–14; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., 
concurring))). 
 15. See e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263 
(2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-1913cv(L), 09-2056cv(CON)), 2009 WL 8379444, at *23. 
 16. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554–55 (“But here, as in Greater New Orleans, we see ‘no need to 
break new ground.’ Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, 
provides an adequate basis for decision.” (quoting Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184)). 
 17. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 15, at 23 (“Justice Thomas repeatedly has 
called for abandonment of intermediate scrutiny ‘[i]n cases such as this, in which the 
government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to 
manipulate their choices in the marketplace.’ Publishers agree with this reasoning . . . .” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 18. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
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between core and commercial speech, and First Amendment analysis 
should reflect this. 
This Article continues in Part II by distinguishing between core 
and commercial speech. Part II also discusses the importance of 
retaining these distinctions in order to enable the government to both 
protect and inform consumers. If the Court altered the current 
commercial speech doctrine, serious implications would result.
19
 
Part III discusses such consequences in the context of commercial 
disclosure requirements. Part IV addresses the need to maintain 
intermediate scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech based on 
the values underlying the First Amendment. This is necessary in 
order to protect consumers from false, misleading, and deceptive 
commercial speech. 
Part IV further argues that the Central Hudson test has proven to 
protect commercial speech against unwarranted government 
restrictions for decades despite the fact that its application has not 
been straightforward. Because it would be dangerous to depart from 
well-established precedent applying intermediate protection to 
commercial speech, the Court should explain this standard in future 
cases. Rather than corrupting the distinction between core and 
commercial speech, the Court should provide expanded explanation 
through future commercial speech cases to clarify the boundaries of 
the doctrine. 
II.  THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL  
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CORE  
AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
A.  Core and Commercial Speech  
Have Their Own Intricacies 
Parties and Justices who argue that it is possible to have one test 
(strict scrutiny) to determine if restrictions on core and commercial 
speech are constitutional, and one test (strict scrutiny) to determine if 
 
 19. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56 
(2000) (“The alternative vision implies, for example, that the First Amendment could no longer 
countenance compelled disclosures within the realm of commercial speech. . . . Nor could the 
Court any longer tolerate regulations of commercial speech that were significantly more 
overinclusive than those accepted within public discourse. The same precision of regulation 
would be applicable to both. Nor could the misleading requirement any longer be 
employed . . . .”). 
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compulsions of core and commercial speech are constitutional, fail to 
appreciate the different needs, protections, and values underlying 
both types of speech.
20
 The freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment embodies the Constitution’s “commitment to the free 
exchange of ideas,”
21
 which reflects the national commitment to 
open debate of “public issues” and “governmental affairs.”
22
 Thus, at 
the core of the First Amendment is the protection of ideas and most 
often takes the form of political and religious speech.
23
 On the other 
hand, commercial speech is a recent construction that has been 
defined as “speech that proposes a commercial transaction.”
24
 The 
majority of commercial speech cases involve government restrictions 
on advertisements for products and services.
25
 
In his dissenting opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
26
 Justice 
Breyer stated: 
I begin with what I believe is common ground: . . . 
Because virtually all human interaction takes place through 
speech, the First Amendment cannot offer all speech the 
same degree of protection. Rather, judges must apply 
different protective presumptions in different contexts, 
scrutinizing government’s speech-related restrictions 
differently depending upon the general category of 
activity.
27
 
 
 20. Id. (“The Court thus seems to be working its way toward a fundamental choice. It can 
either continue the task of fashioning doctrine on the assumption that the First Amendment 
safeguards the informational function of commercial speech, or it can overturn its prior doctrinal 
structure and remake commercial speech doctrine as though it were protecting participation 
within the process of self-government. I do not think that the Court has thoroughly canvassed the 
enormous implications of the latter alternative.”). 
 21. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). 
 22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 23. See id. (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); see also Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (explaining that religious speech is 
protected under the First Amendment). 
 24. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989). 
 25. Post, supra note 19, at 5. 
 26. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 27. Id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal numbering omitted) (majority holding that the 
First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline of public employees for making 
statements pursuant to employees’ official duties). 
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Justice Breyer went on to contrast a political speech case with 
cases addressing commercial and government speech.
28
 Justice 
Thomas disagrees that this is common ground and has offered 
opinions on the other end of the spectrum. Justice Thomas believes 
that restrictions and compulsions of core and commercial speech 
should garner the same strict scrutiny.
29
 But Justice Thomas’s view 
fails to consider that there is not one single strict scrutiny test for 
restrictions and compulsions of core speech. In fact, the Court has 
established two different tiered degrees of protection in both the core 
and commercial speech areas.
30
 
Core speech has many intricacies. Normally, core speech 
receives the highest level of First Amendment protection, but this is 
not always the case. The Court upheld the Federal Communication 
Commission’s ability to regulate offensive words in broadcast 
radio,
31
 a state’s ability to ban the sale of indecent material to youth 
under age seventeen,
32
 a school’s ability to regulate student 
expression in a school newspaper,
33
 a school district’s ability to 
regulate union communication in teachers’ school mailboxes,
34
 and a 
city’s ability to limit political speech on its transit system vehicles.
35
 
Strict scrutiny was not used to analyze any of these restrictions on 
core speech; therefore, they represent a reduced level of protection 
for core speech in limited circumstances. Specifically, based on the 
 
 28. Id. at 444–45 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(political speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (government speech); Cent. Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, (1980) (commercial speech)). 
 29. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575–76 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2001) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that he doubts “an entirely different standard of review for 
regulations that compel, rather than suppress, commercial speech” is justified); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496–97 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute at issue here 
should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other content-based abridgment of 
protected speech.”). 
 30. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410. 
 31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 325–26 (2d Cir. 2010) (“And the Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed 
the distinction between broadcasting and other forms of media since Pacifica. . . . While Pacifica 
did not specify what level of scrutiny applies to restrictions on broadcast speech, subsequent 
cases have applied something akin to intermediate scrutiny.” (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 866–67 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989); FCC v. 
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984))). 
 32. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 33. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 34. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 35. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
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mode of transmission (broadcast media), or the different levels of 
protection granted to children, or the occurrence of speech on the 
government’s own property, core speech can sometimes be restricted 
without implicating or resorting to strict scrutiny.
36
 
Commercial speech, likewise, has various facets to it.
37
 The 
commercial speech doctrine has developed over the years, starting in 
1976 with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.
38
 (which confirmed that commercial speech 
is protected by the First Amendment to a different degree than core 
speech is) and continuing to the 1980 Central Hudson case
39
 (which 
defined the intermediate test for restrictions on commercial speech 
and confirmed that false, deceptive, and misleading commercial 
speech is not protected by the First Amendment). These cases were 
followed by Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
40
 in 1985 
(which found that commercial disclosure requirements are subject to 
“reasonable” basis review) and then Lorillard
41
 in 2001 (which 
applied United States v. O’Brien
42
 to regulations of conduct that may 
implicate commercial expression). In 2002, the Court took up the 
 
 36. Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (“First, in 
traditional public forums, such as public streets and parks, ‘any restriction based on the content 
of . . . speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling government interest.’ Second, governmental entities create designated public 
forums when ‘government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is 
intentionally opened up for that purpose’; speech restrictions in such a forum ‘are subject to the 
same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum.’ Third, governmental entities 
establish limited public forums by opening property ‘limited to use by certain groups or dedicated 
solely to the discussion of certain subjects.’ As noted in text, ‘[i]n such a forum, a governmental 
entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.’” (citations 
omitted)). The Supreme Court originally used the term “nonpublic forum,” Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998), but recently changed the term to “limited public 
forum.” See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11. The dissent in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense 
& Educational Fund, Inc., used “limited public forum” to indicate “designated public forum.” 
473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985). The Ninth Circuit uses the term “limited public forum” as a “sub-
category of a designated public forum.” Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 968 (9th 
Cir. 2008). Understandably, there has been some confusion regarding the designation of “limited 
public forum.” See, e.g., Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 37. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“As our review of 
the case law reveals, Rhode Island errs in concluding that all commercial speech regulations are 
subject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of 
expression. The mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself 
dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.”). 
 38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 39. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 40. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 41. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 42. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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issue again in Thompson
43
 (which emphasized that regulating speech 
must be a last, not first, resort), and again, in 2011, in IMS Health
44
 
(which subjected a regulatory program that affects commercial 
speech to First Amendment scrutiny and brought content- and 
speaker-based concerns into the commercial speech context).
45
 The 
Court has generally become more hostile to commercial speech 
restrictions along the way. 
In both the core and commercial speech contexts, some speech 
remains unprotected by the First Amendment. Some seemingly core 
speech garners no protection under the First Amendment, including 
obscene speech,
46
 defamation,
47
 and inciting—or fighting—words.
48
 
But the First Amendment does protect the related sexually oriented 
depictions,
49
 false and erroneous political and religious statements,
50
 
 
 43. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002). 
 44. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, it is not surprising that, until today, this Court 
has never found that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of 
information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate–whether the information rests in 
government files or has remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it.”); see also 
Kevin Outterson, Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public Health Regulation, NEW ENG. J. 
MED., Aug. 18, 2011, at e13(1), e13(1) (originally published Aug. 3, 2011) (“Instead of dealing 
with this statute under existing precedent, Kennedy seized the opportunity to expand the First 
Amendment’s reach and power to strike down government regulation of health care 
information.”). 
 46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 
S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“[T]he obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover 
whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of ‘sexual conduct.’”). 
 47. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 48. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (“Other distinctions based on content have been approved in the years 
since [Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)]. The government may forbid speech 
calculated to provoke a fight. . . . It may treat libels against private citizens more severely than 
libels against public officials. Obscenity may be wholly prohibited. And only two Terms ago [in 
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976),] we refused to hold that a 
‘statutory classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication 
protected by the First Amendment.’” (citations omitted)); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at 
all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace.”). 
 49. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 50. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964). 
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and “misguided, or even hurtful” speech.
51
 Restrictions on protected 
core speech receive strict scrutiny, and courts must determine 
whether the speech is protected prior to applying the appropriate test. 
Similarly, in the commercial context, false, deceptive, and 
misleading commercial speech are not protected by the First 
Amendment.
52
 But potentially misleading commercial speech is 
protected to an intermediate degree, like other commercial speech.
53
 
And then there is false speech—the one area that is more 
straightforward in the context of commercial speech than it is in the 
context of core speech. False commercial speech is not protected,
54
 
but when it comes to core speech, this category is unclear.
55
 The 
Court famously explained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
56
 that 
erroneous statements of fact are “inevitable in free debate”; thus, in 
the area of core speech, the First Amendment requires the protection 
of “some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”
57
 Hence, 
false statements have been tolerated, but it is unclear how far this 
allowance reaches. For example, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits came 
to opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the Stolen 
Valor Act, which proscribes lying about military achievements and 
permits punishment thereof as a criminal offense.
58
 Both courts 
relied on Gertz as the basis for their holdings.
59
 
The Ninth Circuit found the Act to be a content-based speech 
restriction subject to strict scrutiny, under which it failed, and noted 
that finding otherwise would create a slippery slope of criminalizing 
lying in general, such as about one’s height, weight, and age.
60
 The 
 
 51. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 
(1995) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (finding that the First Amendment 
protects racist political speech by a Ku Klux Klan group leader)). 
 52. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976). 
 55. Rickhoff v. Willing, No. SA-10-CA-140-XR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96557, at *17 n.4 
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010). 
 56. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 57. Id. at 340–41. 
 58. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the Stolen 
Valor Act unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 457 
(2011), with United States v. Strandlof, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1494 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2012) 
(upholding the Stolen Valor Act as constitutional and not offending the First Amendment). 
 59. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1202–11; Strandlof, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1494, at *9–10, *25–
42. 
 60. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
  
400 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:389 
Tenth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, reading the Act 
to include a scienter requirement, and finding the Act constitutional 
since it “does not encroach on any protected speech.”
61
 The Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari on the Ninth Circuit case.
62
 Whatever 
ultimately happens to the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, 
these cases highlight the uncertainty surrounding protection of false 
statements in the core speech realm. 
Conversely, there is no question that false statements of 
commercial speech are not protected.
63
 For example, if a car 
company falsely claimed to win an award by Car and Driver in its 
television advertisements, there would be no question that this would 
not be protected as commercial speech. This distinction is not based 
on the speaker but on the speech. To the extent that people can make 
“erroneous statement[s] of fact”
64
 on political matters, so can 
corporations.
65
 However, it would undermine the very value of 
commercial speech to make similar allowances when the same 
corporations seek to propose a commercial transaction to an 
unassuming party. 
B.  Core and Commercial  
Speech Benefit Society Differently 
The purpose and constitutional values at stake for protecting 
core speech are fundamentally different from those underlying the 
protection for commercial speech. For core speech, the First 
Amendment guards against government interference for the benefit 
of both the listener and the speaker. Justice Marshall aptly observed 
 
 61. Strandlof, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1494, at *14–15, *52–53; see also United States v. 
Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819 (W.D. Va. 2011) (finding the speech at issue “is not ‘speech 
that matters,’” so it falls outside First Amendment protection (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)). 
 62. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 457. 
 63. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“Not only does regulation of inaccurate commercial speech exclude little truthful speech from 
the market, but false or misleading speech in the commercial realm also lacks the value that 
sometimes inheres in false or misleading political speech. [T]he consequences of false 
commercial speech can be particularly severe: Investors may lose their savings, and consumers 
may purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that do not work as 
advertised. [T]he evils of false commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact 
on commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to 
control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of 
most other speech.” (citation omitted)). 
 64. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
 65. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906–07, 917 (2010). 
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that “the First Amendment protects . . . the freedom to hear as well as 
the freedom to speak. . . . The activity of speakers becoming listeners 
and listeners becoming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is 
the ‘means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth.’”
66
 This type of exchange only occurs in the realm of core 
speech. 
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court explained that the primary 
purpose for protecting commercial speech is to ensure the free flow 
of commercial information to benefit the listener to support 
intelligent and well-informed consumer decisions.
67
 The Court 
consistently emphasized that the “extension of First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value 
to consumers of the information such speech provides.”
68
 In Virginia 
Pharmacy, the Court also identified several reasons justifying the 
“different degree of protection” for commercial and core speech: 
commercial speech is more durable and easily verifiable by the 
speaker, there is less likelihood of it being chilled, and the audience 
often receives its sole source of information from the commercial 
actor itself who alone can verify its accuracy.
69
 Upon this strong 
foundation the commercial speech doctrine emerged. This rationale 
has guided courts, regulators, and commercial actors since 1976 and 
is at the foundation of the government’s ability to effectively protect 
consumers from corrupted or incomplete speech.
70
 
 
 66. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)); see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969) (finding that the First Amendment protects racist political speech by a leader of a Ku Klux 
Klan group). 
 67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–
65 (1976). 
 68. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see also City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 432 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting 
the “Court’s emphasis on the First Amendment interests of the listener in the commercial speech 
context”). 
 69. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24; cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have observed previously that there is no 
‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that “commercial” speech is of “lower value” than 
“noncommercial” speech.’” (quoting 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 70. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the disclosure of product and other 
commercial information.” (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434 (reporting of federal election campaign 
contributions); 15 U.S.C. § 78l (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (tobacco labeling); 21 
U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (nutritional labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (reporting of pollutant concentrations 
in discharges to water); 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R. 
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In order to uphold these principles, the Court must maintain the 
First Amendment’s reduced protection for commercial speech. 
Interestingly, the Court has made the opposite argument for 
maintaining a reduced protection for commercial speech in that 
“parity . . . could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the 
force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to [core] speech.”
71
 
Parity of constitutional protection for core and commercial speech 
would also have the opposite outcome of creating an unfair and 
inefficient market where the government could not adequately 
inform and protect consumers. Since commercial speech is “the 
offspring of economic self-interest,” only by maintaining 
intermediate protection for commercial speech can we ensure that the 
bargaining process is fair and consumers are protected.
72
 
The government must be permitted to compel factual 
commercial disclosure requirements,
73
 effectively deal with 
misleading and deceptive commercial speech,
74
 and protect 
consumers from overreaching by commercial speakers.
75
 
Commercial actors are guarded against “unwarranted government 
regulation” through the intermediate test created in Central Hudson. 
These essential aspects of the commercial speech doctrine serve 
society’s “strong interest in the free flow of commercial information” 
in order to protect and maintain transparent and efficient markets 
based on “intelligent and well informed” consumers.
76
 In the absence 
of intermediate-level protection, this system could not be maintained. 
Consumers would be unprotected and the U.S. markets would cease 
to be efficient. 
 
§ 202.1 (disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (posting 
notification of workplace hazards); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (“Proposition 65”; 
warning of potential exposure to certain hazardous substances); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 
§ 33-0707 (disclosure of pesticide formulas))). 
 71. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
 72. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) 
(citations omitted). 
 73. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 74. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72. 
 75. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 634; cf. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 
(1989) (“The Court of Appeals also held, and we agree, that the governmental interests asserted in 
support of the resolution are substantial: promoting an educational rather than commercial 
atmosphere on SUNY’s campuses, promoting safety and security, preventing commercial 
exploitation of students, and preserving residential tranquility.”). 
 76. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764–65. 
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III.  THE COMPULSION  
OF CORE AND  
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
A.  Commercial Disclosure Requirements Are  
Necessary to Protect and Inform Consumers 
The divergent constitutional value of protecting commercial 
speech supports the government’s ability to require factual 
disclosures, without which commercial speech would only benefit 
the speaker and his economic interests. This would be in direct 
contradiction to the initial purpose of protecting commercial speech 
in the first place. 
The Court consistently confirms its preference for transparency 
in commercial transactions and consumer access to truthful 
commercial information to make informed decisions.
77
 This predates 
Virginia Pharmacy. As early as 1919, the Court found that “it is too 
plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no 
constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair 
information of what it is that is being sold.”
78
 As a result, the U.S. 
regulatory landscape includes commercial disclosure requirements so 
consumers have truthful information relevant to the products and 
services available in the commercial marketplace. 
To this end, the Court has found that commercial disclosure 
requirements are constitutional if they are reasonably related to a 
valid government interest. The Court has decided two cases on this 
issue, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States
79
 in 2010 
and Zauderer in 1985, both expressly recognizing and upholding a 
commercial disclosure requirement as “reasonably related” to the 
government’s interest.
80
 In both cases, the government’s interest was 
“in preventing deception of consumers.”
81
 It has been argued that 
preventing deception is the only appropriate government interest to 
uphold disclosure requirements,
82
 but this is not the case. First, 
 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 765. 
 78. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919). 
 79. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
 80. Id. at 1341; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 81. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (unanimously 
upholding a requirement that professionals must disclose that their services are for debt relief 
under the Bankruptcy Code). 
 82. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132–34 (2d Cir. 
2009) (describing how Appellant argued that Zauderer’s “rational basis test” is limited “to those 
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several Justices have also identified the danger of incomplete 
information to justify disclosure requirements;
83
 and, second, all 
circuit courts to consider that argument have disagreed.
84
 Circuit 
courts have expressly found that compelled disclosures are 
constitutionally valid if they are instituted simply to “better inform 
consumers about the products they purchase.”
85
 There are hundreds 
of requirements currently in the commercial marketplace that 
primarily function to provide consumers with factual information to 
promote informed decision-making, and sometimes nothing more. It 
is true that many prevent deception or correct the dangers of 
incomplete information, but many are implemented to promote 
informed decision-making by providing information.
86
 
In Zauderer, the Court confirmed that “the extension of First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally 
by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, 
[so commercial actors’] constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is 
 
situations in which the law at issue furthers the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers”); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“PCMA 
states that the holding in Zauderer is ‘limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at 
consumers.’ . . . [W]e have found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a way.”). 
 83. For example, Justice Stevens in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. recognized the interest in 
protecting “consumers from the dangers of incomplete information.” 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). The dissent in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., found that 
disclosure requirements could be implemented to avoid misleading or incomplete commercial 
messages. 521 U.S. 457, 490–91 (1997) (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and 
Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Zauderer thereby reaffirmed a longstanding preference for disclosure 
requirements over outright bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the potential of commercial 
messages to mislead by saying too little. But however long the pedigree of such mandates may 
be, and however broad the government’s authority to impose them, Zauderer carries no authority 
for a mandate unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial 
messages.” (citations omitted)). 
 84. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132–34; Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 429 F.3d at 
310 n.8; Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 851 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a statute requiring the disclosure 
of information related to mercury contained in light bulbs was valid in order to inform consumers 
about such dangers of the product). 
 85. See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115 (“To be sure, the compelled disclosure at issue here was not 
intended to prevent ‘consumer confusion or deception’ per se, but rather to better inform 
consumers about the products they purchase. . . . Accordingly, we cannot say that the statute’s 
goal is inconsistent with the policies underlying First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech, described above, and the reasons supporting the distinction between compelled and 
restricted commercial speech. We therefore find that it is governed by the reasonable-relationship 
rule in Zauderer.” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)); accord Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 429 
F.3d at 310 n.8. 
 86. See Post, supra note 19, at 4. 
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minimal.”
87
 Disclosure requirements are based on the “informational 
function” of commercial speech and the accepted understanding that 
it would be impossible for consumers to verify such information on 
their own.
88
 As a result, the U.S. regulatory landscape is replete with 
commercial disclosure requirements—“that the speaker might not 
make voluntarily”—both to give consumers truthful information 
about products and services and to protect consumers from economic 
and physical harm.
89
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, imposes 
mandatory disclosure requirements on publicly traded companies.
90
 
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 requires the 
disclosure of ingredient and nutrition information on food and 
beverage products.
91
 The Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2004 requires the disclosure of the presence of 
eight common food allergens.
92
 The Federal Hazardous Substances 
 
 87. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted); see also id. at 651 n.14 (“The right of a 
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not such a 
fundamental right.”). 
 88. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 & n.6 
(1980). 
 89. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 & n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“In the commercial context . . . government . . . often requires affirmative disclosures that the 
speaker might not make voluntarily.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77e (requiring a registration statement 
before selling securities); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (requiring “Surgeon General’s Warning” labels on 
cigarettes); 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1988 ed. & Supp. V) (setting labeling requirements for food 
products); 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1988 ed. & Supp. V) (setting labeling requirements for drug 
products))); see also Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 116 (“Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs 
require the disclosure of product and other commercial information. To hold that the Vermont 
statute [requiring disclosures for mercury-containing products] is insufficiently related to the 
state’s interest in reducing mercury pollution would expose these long-established programs to 
searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a result is neither wise nor constitutionally 
required.” (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434 (reporting of federal election campaign contributions); 15 
U.S.C. § 78l (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) 
(nutritional labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (reporting of pollutant concentrations in discharges to 
water); 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 
(disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (posting notification of 
workplace hazards); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (“Proposition 65”; warning of 
potential exposure to certain hazardous substances); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-0707 
(disclosure of pesticide formulas))). 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
 91. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 92. Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-282, 
118 Stat. 891, 905–11 (2004). This Act provides a good example of a law that could arguably be 
related to preventing deception, but clearly was passed to simply inform consumers of 
information that only may be relevant to their health and safety. Peanut allergies are the most 
common cause of fatal food-induced anaphylaxis in the U.S. Fred D. Finkelman, Peanut Allergy 
and Anaphylaxis, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN IMMUNOLOGY 783 (2010). In the absence of 
  
406 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:389 
Act requires that labels disclose whether a product is toxic, corrosive, 
flammable, or combustible.
93
 Federal law also requires the Surgeon 
General’s Warning to be posted on tobacco products to inform 
consumers of the health hazards associated with using tobacco,
94
 and 
it requires alcohol-content disclosures to be listed on beverage 
packaging and labels.
95
 States have their own sets of disclosure 
requirements in areas ranging from credit card applications to 
lotteries and time-share proposals.
96
 There are innumerable federal 
and state laws requiring the disclosure of factual information that 
promote transparency, fairness, informed decision-making, and fair 
and efficient commercial markets.
97
 
In his concurring opinion in Milavetz, Justice Thomas 
acknowledged that the “Court’s longstanding assumption” was 
correct: “that a consumer-fraud regulation that compels the 
disclosure of certain factual information in advertisements may 
intrude less significantly on First Amendment interests than an 
outright prohibition on all advertisements that have the potential to 
mislead.”
98
 However, he simultaneously “doubt[ed] that it justifie[d] 
an entirely different standard of review for regulations that compel, 
rather than suppress, commercial speech.”
99
 There are several 
problems with this perspective. First, if consumer-fraud regulations 
that compel factual information disclosures tread less significantly on 
the First Amendment than commercial speech restrictions do, it is 
 
disclosure requirements, accidental ingestion is common; for example, 75 percent of those 
surveyed in Canada with peanut allergies ingested peanuts accidentally. Saleh Al-Muhsen et al., 
Peanut Allergy: An Overview, 168 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1279, 1282 (2003). 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1958); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4852d (1992) (requiring information on 
lead-based paint hazards to be disclosed before the sale or lease of residential housing built prior 
to 1978). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). 
 95. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1934). 
 96. Texas law requires advertisements for timeshare interests to disclose the purpose of the 
solicitation, how the recipients’ information will be used, and the marketers’ company 
information. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.031 (Vernon 2007). Minnesota law requires credit 
card applications to disclose rates, fees, and conditions, among other information, to protect 
consumers. MINN. STAT. § 325G.42 (2011). Florida law requires that brochures, advertisements, 
notices, tickets, and entry forms used by charities for a “drawing by chance” disclose the rules, 
source of funds, and information about the organization, among other things. FLA. STAT. 
§ 849.0935 (2011). 
 97. See Post, supra note 19, at 27–28. 
 98. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. 
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unclear how this appreciation should take practical form if the 
constitutional tests on their validity do not reflect this difference. The 
former necessarily requires reduced constitutional protection. 
Second, under Justice Thomas’s view, both regulations that compel 
and restrict commercial speech would be subject to strict scrutiny; 
under the Court’s precedent this is often fatal to a speech 
regulation.
100
 This would defeat consumer fraud regulations, which 
are universally regarded as necessary and constitutional. Finally, 
Justice Thomas believes the First Amendment should protect core 
and commercial speech the same.
101
 However, core speech cannot 
similarly be compelled. And in Justice Thomas’s view, basic 
disclaimers cannot be compelled in the core speech category either, 
which further undermines the validity and practicality of his 
perspective.
102
 Accepting this viewpoint of commercial speech 
would mean the demise of the current commercial disclosure system 
supporting an informed and efficient marketplace. 
The government’s ability to require factual commercial 
disclosures is necessarily based on the reduced constitutional 
protection supporting commercial speech.
103
 The same allowance 
does not exist in the realm of core speech. If commercial speech 
were strictly protected, it would logically follow that such 
disclosures would be subject to stricter scrutiny, under which they 
would not likely survive. The result would be a failure of the current 
regulatory environment. The Court could not intend for this to occur 
since it unanimously upheld a commercial disclosure requirement 
under the reasonable relationship test in 2010.
104
 Blanket increased 
protection for commercial speech cannot coexist with the need for 
and constitutionality of commercial disclosure requirements. 
 
 100. The application of strict scrutiny to restrictions on core speech is almost always fatal. But 
see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding, in a plurality opinion, a statute 
prohibiting campaigning within one hundred feet of the entrance to a polling place under the strict 
scrutiny test under the First Amendment). 
 101. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I 
have observed previously that there is no ‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 
“commercial” speech is of “lower value” than “noncommercial” speech.’” (citing 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996))). 
 102. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980–82 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 103. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: 
The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159 (2009). 
 104. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339–40. 
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B.  Core Speech Cannot  
Be Similarly Compelled 
In direct contrast with regulations that compel factual 
disclosures in the commercial market, core speech cannot be 
similarly compelled.
105
 In the realm of fully protected speech, 
requiring substantive disclosures is untenable under the First 
Amendment. Speakers are protected from being compelled to utter 
beliefs and facts against their will in all facets of core speech, 
ranging from newsletters
106
 to parades
107
 to automobile license 
plates.
108
 The First Amendment recognizes a “constitutional 
equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the 
context of fully protected expression.”
109
 Thus, the freedom 
applicable to core speech necessarily comprises “the decision of both 
what to say and what not to say.”
110
 
Although most core speech cases protect citizens from 
compelled statements of belief,
111
 in Riley v. National Federation of 
the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,
112
 the Court explained that these 
other “cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved 
compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled 
statements of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens protected 
speech.”
113
 The Court struck down a provision that required the 
yearly disclosure of the average percentage of gross receipts turned 
over to charities by a fundraiser for all charitable solicitations that it 
conducted in the state.
114
 Government-mandated substantive factual 
disclosures, like beliefs, are subject to strict scrutiny in the realm of 
fully protected speech.
115
 
The Court has permitted minimal disclaimers in the realm of 
core speech. These are often minor mandates to disclose the source 
 
 105. See Pomeranz, supra note 103, at 171–73. 
 106. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 107. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 108. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 109. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (holding unconstitutional a state law that required 
New Hampshire motorists to display the state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their license 
plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional 
a state law requiring schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and to salute the flag). 
 112. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 113. Id. at 797–98. 
 114. Id. at 798. 
 115. Id. at 795–801. 
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of the speech rather than factual information, as in the commercial 
disclosure area.
116
 The Justices have had mixed opinions regarding 
even these minor directives. In Citizens United v. FEC,
117
 the 
majority upheld disclosure requirements consisting of the name and 
address of the person or group that funds electioneering 
communications and a disclaimer statement showing whether the 
communication was authorized by the candidate.
118
 Similarly, in 
Riley, the Act’s provisions requiring a professional fundraiser to 
disclose to potential donors his or her name and employer, including 
the address, were not challenged.
119
 However, in a footnote, the 
majority explicitly found these provisions to be constitutionally 
acceptable, stating: “[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to 
suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose 
unambiguously his or her professional status. On the contrary, such a 
narrowly tailored requirement would withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.”
120
 The majority also distinguished between the disclaimers 
it found permissible and more substantive ones it would have found 
problematic: “[W]e would not immunize a law requiring a speaker 
favoring a particular government project to state at the outset of 
every address the average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law 
requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to state during 
every solicitation that candidate’s recent travel budget.”
121
 
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
122
 the majority 
struck down, under strict scrutiny, Ohio’s law requiring all written 
documents designed to influence voters in an election (including 
leaflets—at issue in the case) to state “the name and residence or 
business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the 
organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is 
responsible therefor.”
123
 Unlike Riley and Citizens United, McIntyre 
involved a private citizen whose personal information was not found 
 
 116. Minimal disclaimers are common in the commercial realm. See, e.g., 21 CFR § 101.5 
(2011) (requiring packaged food labels to specify the name and place of business of the 
manufacturer, packer, or distributor). 
 117. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 913–16. 
 119. Riley, 487 U.S. at 786. 
 120. Id. at 799 n.11. 
 121. Id. at 798. 
 122. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 123. Id. at 345 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988)). 
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to be relevant to the political message.
124
 The Court found that the 
law served the state’s interest in deterring false statements,
125
 even 
though the First Amendment does allow false statements in political 
speech.
126
 
Justice Scalia dissented in McIntyre, which was inconsistent 
with his First Amendment position in Riley. Justice Scalia joined the 
majority in Riley with the exception of its footnote stating that the 
state may require a fundraiser to disclose his or her professional 
status.
127
 Justice Scalia found that the forced disclosure by the 
professional solicitor of his professional status should be subject to 
strict scrutiny because it involves core First Amendment speech.
128
 
Conversely, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion in 
McIntyre, stating that the “law at issue here, by contrast, forbids the 
expression of no idea, but merely requires identification of the 
speaker when the idea is uttered in the electoral context. It is at the 
periphery of the First Amendment . . . .”
129
 
Justice Thomas concurred with the result in McIntyre
130
 and 
dissented from the portion of the opinion in Citizens United 
upholding the disclaimer and disclosure requirements.
131
 Justice 
Thomas found that corporate disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting 
requirements are unconstitutional compulsions of fact.
132
 In his 
opinion, any compulsions in the core realm should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.
133
 Under this rationale, no disclaimer or disclosure 
requirements could ever be considered constitutionally permissible 
unless they were commercial in nature and tied only to preventing 
deception.
134
 Yet Justice Thomas would still subject them to strict 
scrutiny, which is untenable under the Court’s precedent and in the 
 
 124. Id. at 348–49. 
 125. Id. at 350–51. 
 126. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
 127. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 803–04 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 128. See id. 
 129. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 131. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 980–81. 
 133. See id. at 980. 
 134. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342–45 
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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context of the current consumer protection regulatory structure 
described above. 
If the Court found a constitutional equivalence for core and 
commercial speech, the result would be that only minimal 
disclaimers would be permitted in the commercial context. Such 
simple disclaimers would be insufficient to inform and protect the 
public and rectify potential abuses that the government currently has 
the authority to address in the commercial marketplace. This is not a 
minor point. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional 
Rights, Inc.,
135
 the Court explained why regulations compelling fully 
protected speech could not survive strict scrutiny: 
The compelled-speech violations in Tornillo and 
Pacific Gas also resulted from interference with a speaker’s 
desired message. In Tornillo, we recognized that “the 
compelled printing of a reply . . . tak[es] up space that could 
be devoted to other material the newspaper may have 
preferred to print,” and therefore concluded that this right-
of-reply statute infringed the newspaper editors’ freedom of 
speech by altering the message the paper wished to express. 
The same is true in Pacific Gas. There, . . . when the state 
agency ordered the utility to send a third-party newsletter 
four times a year, it interfered with the utility’s ability to 
communicate its own message in its newsletter.
136
 
If commercial speech regulations were subject to strict scrutiny, 
commercial actors would have this argument available to them and 
the current regulatory system would become constitutionally suspect. 
Under this scenario, companies could still be required to disclose the 
names and addresses of their businesses, but they would have a 
strong argument that the required disclosure of any other information 
(e.g., investor-related information under the Securities Exchange Act 
or ingredients and allergen information under the Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act) violates their First Amendment rights not to 
speak, interferes with their “ability to communicate [their] own 
message,” and “takes up space that could be devoted to other 
material.”
137
 
 
 135. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 136. Id. at 64 (citations omitted). 
 137. Id. 
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This is not a hypothetical concern. Upon passage of New York 
City’s menu-labeling ordinance,
138
 the New York State Restaurant 
Association challenged the factual disclosure ordinance based on the 
very same First Amendment grounds described above in Rumsfeld.
139
 
They unsuccessfully made the exact same arguments about covered 
food service establishments’ menu boards, but since the ordinance 
required only factual commercial disclosures, subject to less exacting 
review, the reviewing courts upheld the ordinance under Zauderer.
140
 
In the commercial context, substantive disclosures are often required 
to protect and inform consumers in a way that they could not be 
protected or informed absent the divergent constitutional values and 
protections underlying the commercial speech doctrine.
141
 
The very fact that the Court was able to decide Milavetz and 
Zauderer under reasonable basis review is necessarily due to the 
reduced protection for commercial speech under the First 
Amendment. Commercial disclosures are based on the constitutional 
values underlying the protection of commercial speech: its 
information function and value to consumers. The Court upheld the 
disclosure requirements at issue in Milavetz and Zauderer precisely 
because it recognized that commercial speech garners a different 
level of constitutional protection than core speech. 
IV.  INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY  
FOR RESTRICTIONS ON  
COMMERCIAL SPEECH IS NECESSARY 
Intermediate scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech is 
appropriate in light of the different values underlying its 
protection.
142
 Because commercial speech is protected to ensure the 
“free flow of commercial information,”
143
 the Court has guarded 
commercial speech against “unwarranted governmental regulation” 
 
 138. N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50. 
 139. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 1000 (RJH), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31451 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008), aff’d, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 142. Akhil Reed Amar, How America’s Constitution Affirmed Freedom of Speech Even 
Before the First Amendment, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 503, 507 (2010). 
 143. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976). 
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through the four-part intermediate test created in Central Hudson, 
which states: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech 
to come within that provision, it at least must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.
144
 
The Court’s commercial speech cases have primarily involved 
government restrictions on advertising itself and focused on society’s 
interest in, and consumers’ right to receive, commercial 
information.
145
 Intermediate scrutiny reflects the values inherent in 
the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, while it 
simultaneously recognizes the government’s legitimate and 
substantial interest in regulating overreaching commercial 
communication.
146
 Although it has been argued that the Central 
Hudson test is not appropriate to determine whether government 
restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional because it is not 
strict enough,
147
 the Court frequently strikes down commercial 
speech restrictions after comparing the government’s interests to 
those underlying the First Amendment.
148
 In very rare instances, the 
 
 144. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 566 (1980). 
 145. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (discussing solicitation 
and advertisement of compounded drugs); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) 
(discussing tobacco billboards and retail advertisements); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (discussing broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino 
gambling); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (discussing retail liquor 
price advertising); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (discussing labeling and 
advertising of beer alcohol content); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (discussing advertising by an 
electrical utility); Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (discussing advertisement and promotion of 
prescription drug prices). The basis for the First Amendment protection for “commercial 
advertising,” as it has been called, see, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 
418, 426 (1993), is society’s interest in the free flow of commercial information. Va. Pharmacy, 
425 U.S. at 764. 
 146. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–66. 
 147. See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, Justice Thomas 
has used the Central Hudson test to examine commercial speech regulations in Coors Brewing, 
514 U.S. 476. 
 148. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. 357; Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525; Greater New Orleans 
Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. 173 ; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484; Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. 476. 
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Court has found that the commercial speech at issue was subject to 
abuse and overreaching, thus warranting restraint.
149
 In light of the 
fact that commercial speech restrictions rarely withstand Central 
Hudson review, stricter scrutiny is not required in order to protect 
commercial speakers from government infringement of their First 
Amendment rights. 
The full Central Hudson test has proven difficult for courts to 
apply and difficult for the government to meet.
150
 Justices’ and lower 
courts’ divergent understandings of how to apply the test is not a 
reason to retreat from intermediate scrutiny. Rather, the confusion 
counsels in favor of the Court developing the framework more 
clearly in future cases. 
The four prongs of Central Hudson do not seem to capture the 
true test of the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations. 
The only aspect that all Justices have agreed on is that the First 
Amendment does not protect false,
151
 deceptive, and misleading 
commercial speech, which falls under the first inquiry of Central 
Hudson. The ability of government to restrict misleading and 
deceptive commercial speech is also one of the most important 
aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence that separates commercial 
from core speech and further counsels in favor of maintaining 
intermediate protection for the former. 
A.  Misleading and Deceptive  
Commercial and Core Speech Are  
Vastly Different from Each Other 
In the commercial realm, deceptive and misleading speech is not 
protected. This has been ratified in prong one of Central Hudson
152
 
and embraced by all Justices, including those who expressly reject 
 
 149. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (finding legal solicitation improper, but decided prior to the 
creation of the Central Hudson test). 
 150. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360 (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the 
commercial speech restrictions violated the First Amendment); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 539 
(reversing the First Circuit’s finding that commercial speech restrictions did not violate the First 
Amendment); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 182–83 (reversing the Fifth 
Circuit’s finding that the commercial speech restrictions did not violate the First Amendment); 44 
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489–95 (reversing the First Circuit’s finding that the commercial speech 
restrictions did not violate the First Amendment); Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 478 (affirming the 
Tenth Circuit’s finding that the commercial speech restrictions violated the First Amendment). 
 151. See discussion supra Part II for a comparison of false commercial and core speech. 
 152. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
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the Central Hudson test or intermediate scrutiny for commercial 
speech in general.
153
 The most important point that emerges from 
categorical rejection of First Amendment protection for deceptive 
and misleading commercial speech is that this is, and only can be, 
true in the commercial realm. 
On the other hand, in the realm of core speech, misleading and 
deceptive speech are strictly protected. The freedom of political and 
religious speakers to state beliefs, ideas, and their version of the facts 
is the underpinning of the First Amendment protection for speech.
154
 
The First Amendment guards against government interference in this 
realm for the benefit of both the listener and the speaker, and this 
“vital interchange of thought” is “indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth.”
155
 Strict protection is warranted to 
“maximize the speaker’s freedom of participation within public 
discourse,”
156
 to get his or her opinion “accepted in the competition 
of the market.”
157
 This is true without consideration of the “truth, 
popularity, or social utility” of the core “ideas and beliefs which are 
offered.”
158
 Thus, both the speaker and the listener can decide which 
 
 153. E.g., Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 476. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court struck 
down the commercial speech restriction under the Central Hudson test. Although the full court 
agreed that the commercial actor had a “constitutional right to give the public accurate 
information about the alcoholic content of the malt beverages that it produces,” Justice Stevens 
concurred, stating that strict scrutiny was necessary: 
If Congress had sought to regulate all statements of alcohol content . . . in order to 
prevent brewers from misleading consumers as to the true alcohol content of their 
beverages, then this would be a different case. But absent that concern, . . . the statute 
at issue here should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other content-
based abridgment of protected speech. 
Id. at 496–97 (Stevens, J., concurring). Note that Stevens began his argument by expressing that 
the case “would be different” if the statute at issue intended to protect consumers from misleading 
speech. This inquiry is only relevant within the context of commercial speech. See also Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“I have no quarrel with the principle that advertisements that are false or misleading, 
or that propose an illegal transaction, may be proscribed.”); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 383 (1977) (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to 
restraint.”). 
 154. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010) (“[Such] speech is central to the 
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”). 
 155. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 156. Post, supra note 19, at 40. 
 157. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 158. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444–45 (1963). 
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opinions and beliefs form the truth for themselves and their 
participation in politics and religion.
159
 
Conversely, there is no value to consumers or society for 
misleading or deceptive commercial speech.
160
 The crux of why 
commercial speech is and should be treated differently from fully 
protected expression is that “the public and private benefits from 
commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and 
reliability.”
161
 Since the First Amendment’s concern for commercial 
speech is based on its information function, the listener only benefits 
from accurate commercial information.
162
 To this end, the Court has 
recognized that the First Amendment is not an obstacle to the 
government dealing effectively with deceptive and misleading 
commercial speech.
163
 
A mislabeled product or misleading advertisement undermines a 
well-functioning free market economy and has the potential to hurt 
consumers financially or physically.
164
 Consumers need valid 
commercial information to properly allocate their resources. They do 
not have the time or financial ability to verify all commercial speech 
in order to discover deficiencies in speech made for profit.
165
 As 
there is no outside tool for immediate verification to correct such 
deception, consumers would be left to purchase at their own peril if 
 
 159. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777 
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that, in terms of the press, journalists “must often attempt 
to assemble the true facts from sketchy and sometimes conflicting sources”). 
 160. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens J., concurring) (“[F]alse 
or misleading speech in the commercial realm also lacks the value that sometimes inheres in false 
or misleading political speech.”). 
 161. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
 162. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); see 
also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 432 (1993) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (finding that government regulation of misleading and deceptive speech “is 
consistent with [the] Court’s emphasis on the First Amendment interests of the listener in the 
commercial speech context”); Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 (finding that the government has an 
interest in ensuring the “stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely”). 
 163. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have no quarrel with the 
principle that advertisements that are false or misleading, or that propose an illegal transaction, 
may be proscribed.”); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading 
of course is subject to restraint.”). 
 164. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also Post, supra note 19, at 41 (stating that a 
court should regard consumers as “free and equal citizens” when determining the boundaries of a 
public communicative sphere). 
 165. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“The First 
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of 
advertising.”). 
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the First Amendment did not allow for government intervention on 
their behalf.
166
 Therefore, the distinction between commercial and 
core speech is crucial in the context of misleading and deceptive 
speech. 
The federal regulatory system relies on these distinctions. For 
example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) protects consumers 
from a diverse range of misleading and deceptive commercial speech 
that could otherwise be financially or physically harmful.
167
 For 
instance, the FTC has protected vulnerable consumers from a 
marketer’s misleading claims that an herbal product could cure 
cancer,
168
 a scam promising “cash” for envelope-stuffing,
169
 and a 
cereal manufacturer’s false claims that its cereal was “clinically 
shown to improve children’s attentiveness.”
170
 Similarly, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission prohibits a registered 
investment company from using a materially deceptive or misleading 
name to incorrectly suggest investment in government securities,
171
 
and it also prohibits false and misleading statements in proxy 
solicitation materials.
172
 These restrictions protect investors who 
have less complete information than the companies seeking their 
investments.
173
 
 
 166. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
consequences of false commercial speech can be particularly severe: Investors may lose their 
savings, and consumers may purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that 
do not work as advertised. . . . The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an 
immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of 
commercial speech to control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation 
of this speech than of most other speech.”). 
 167. About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 168. Daniel Chapter One, No. 9329, 2009 FTC LEXIS 157 (F.T.C. Aug. 5, 2009); see also 
Default Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction, Global Web Promotions, No. 04C-3022 
(N.D. Ill. June 16, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423086/050920defjudg0 
423086.pdf (granting injunctive relief for deceptive diet and human growth hormone products). 
 169. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction, Stuffingforcash.com 
Corp., No. 02-C-5022 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/ 
stuffingforcashstip.pdf. 
 170. Order to Show Cause and Order Modifying Order, Kellogg Co., 149 FTC No. C-4262 
(F.T.C. May 28, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823145/100602kellog 
gorder.pdf. 
 171. SEC Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1(a) (2011). 
 172. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011). 
 173. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“Since the advertiser knows his 
product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to 
assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The [commercial] 
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The government must be able to regulate misleading and 
deceptive commercial speech, and such regulation is only possible 
because a different level of protection exists for commercial and core 
speech. The Court has distinguished among three types of 
commercial speech that have a tendency to mislead or deceive and 
that are consequently amenable to regulation by the government: 
inherently misleading, actually misleading (proven to be so), and 
potentially misleading commercial speech.
174
 The government may 
ban or otherwise restrict inherently and actually misleading 
commercial speech, but it can only order correction, revision, or 
increased factual disclosures for potentially misleading commercial 
speech.
175
 If strict protection was applied in this context, courts 
would have to differentiate between inherently and actually 
misleading speech that would not be protected by the First 
Amendment and potentially misleading speech that would be strictly 
prohibited. Granting potentially misleading speech strict protection 
would prohibit the government from requiring corrections or 
disclosures to rectify any potential for deception. This is nonsensical. 
If the Court were to rule that commercial speech is subject to 
strict protection, it would undermine the government’s ability to 
effectively address misleading and deceptive commercial speech.
176
 
Justice Thomas does not consider these to be mutually exclusive. In 
Milavetz, Thomas stated that he has “no quarrel with the principle 
that advertisements that are false or misleading, or that propose an 
 
advertiser’s access to the truth about his product and its price substantially eliminates any danger 
that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill accurate 
and nondeceptive commercial expression.”). 
 174. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See, e.g., Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. v. La. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 24 F.3d 754, 757 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (finding the term “invoice” to be inherently misleading in automobile advertisements); 
Adams Ford Belton, Inc. v. Mo. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 946 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo. 1997) 
(finding the term “invoice” to be inherently misleading); see also Am. Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. 
Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a physician’s use of the term “board 
certified” to be inherently misleading because he did not meet the statutory requirements for 
using the term); N.C. State Bar v. Culbertson, 627 S.E.2d 644, 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (finding 
an attorney advertisement that he was “published” in the Federal Law Reports to be inherently 
misleading); Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 494 A.2d 804, 812 (N.J. 1985) (finding the terms 
“dealer invoice,” “cost,” “inventory,” and “invoice” misleading in automobile advertisements); cf. 
Piazza’s Seafood World, L.L.C. v. Odom, No. 04-690, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25991, at *16–22 
(E.D. La. Dec. 27, 2004) (applying Central Hudson and striking down the speech restriction after 
finding the term “Cajun” to be only potentially misleading because plaintiff’s customers were 
seafood wholesalers and presumably sophisticated buyers). 
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illegal transaction, may be proscribed.”
177
 However, in Lorillard, 
Justice Thomas “doubt[ed] whether it is even possible to draw a 
coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.”
178
 Thus, it is unclear how Justice Thomas would propose to 
separate the type of misleading and deceptive speech that may be 
proscribed from that which is constitutionally protected. Given that 
there is already concern about distinguishing commercial from 
noncommercial speech, it would be extremely difficult, and 
unnecessary, to come up with a new test that distinguishes truthful, 
non-misleading commercial speech from any other commercial 
speech deserving the highest level of First Amendment protection. 
Subjecting all speech restrictions to the same strict review would 
collapse the distinction between commercial and core speech. This 
would be improper, however, because misleading and deceptive 
commercial speech needs to remain unprotected, while misleading 
and deceptive core speech must remain protected in order to advance 
the values underlying the First Amendment. The government must 
retain its ability to restrict false, deceptive, and misleading 
commercial speech in the marketplace. Providing equivalent 
protection to both would decidedly convolute future First 
Amendment analysis. 
If the Court were to upset this precedent, future inquiries would 
be complicated. Courts would have to determine (1) whether the 
speech at issue was formerly considered commercial or core speech; 
(2) whether it was part of a public debate; (3) whether it was 
misleading and deceptive; and (4) whether a restriction would, thus, 
be subject to strict scrutiny or no scrutiny at all.
179
 Such a revised 
constitutional understanding would not only be unwise but the task 
of line-drawing would be rendered significantly more demanding and 
complicated than simply distinguishing commercial from core 
 
 177. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343 n.1 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 178. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 179. Such an outcome would perhaps produce future opinions that resemble the dissent to the 
dismissal of certiorari in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 539 U.S. 654, 665 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Justice Breyer would have decided the First Amendment claims based on whether the speech at 
issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky was considered commercial or core. Id. at 667. He opined that Nike’s 
false statements were “about public matters in public debate” and not commercial speech as the 
California Supreme Court found. Id. Breyer would have thus subjected any restrictions on the 
speech to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 681. If commercial and core speech were subject to the same 
test, cases touching on deceptive or misleading speech would be as convoluted as this opinion. 
  
420 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:389 
speech. The Constitution does not call for such a restructuring or 
revised understanding of the First Amendment. The significant 
difference between core and commercial speech cannot be negated 
by haphazardly applying an identical constitutional analysis to both. 
B.  Intermediate Scrutiny  
Needs Further Explanation 
As discussed extensively above, strict protection is not 
appropriate for commercial speech, and thus intermediate protection 
must be maintained. Therefore, the Court should clarify the 
commercial speech doctrine to maintain this standard. The remaining 
three prongs of Central Hudson do not seem to capture the entire 
inquiry. Even in cases where the Court agrees that the restriction at 
issue directly addresses commercial speech, Justices come to 
different conclusions as to the application of the test.
180
 
IMS Health addressed a Vermont statute that prohibited the sale, 
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records containing “prescriber-
identifying information” for purposes of marketing.
181
 Through this 
method, the pharmaceutical manufacturers used the prescribers’ own 
information for “detailing” by their representatives as a marketing 
tactic in an effort to increase sales of brand-name prescription 
drugs.
182
 The state enacted the law to stop this practice out of 
concern that it was a violation of physicians’ privacy interests and 
that it would lead to the over-prescription of brand-name drugs (as 
opposed to generics), which would in turn drive up medical costs for 
the state.
183
 The Second Circuit found that the law violated the First 
Amendment rights of the pharmaceutical marketers and data 
miners.
184
 However, the First Circuit found that similar laws in 
Maine and New Hampshire were valid regulations of commercial 
conduct and characterized the data at issue as no different than any 
other commodity subject to commercial regulation.
185
 
In IMS Health, the Court said it was applying Central Hudson, 
but to the extent that it did, it actually mentioned the prongs in 
 
 180. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 181. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659–60 (2011). 
 182. Id. at 2660. 
 183. Id. at 2681. 
 184. Id. at 2662. 
 185. Id. at 2666–67. 
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reverse order.
186
 Because the majority found that the law was an 
unconstitutional content- and speaker-based restriction and 
unconventionally cited core speech cases throughout its analysis, 
IMS Health is not a reliable vehicle to analyze the Court’s most 
recent view on the application of the Central Hudson test.
187
 It could 
be that the majority’s position on Central Hudson is that the test is 
no longer relevant, but the case did not present an opportunity to 
adequately overrule the test. The dissent found the law to be an 
economic regulation that affected speech in an indirect way and 
thought it should be analyzed under the rational basis standard.
188
 
Both perspectives are supported by the case law.
189
 At best, the case 
could be an outlier due to the poorly drafted legislative findings
190
 
and the disagreement over whether this was a speech case at all. 
Nonetheless, the case does bring to the forefront outstanding issues 
that the Court needs to resolve if it plans to maintain intermediate 
scrutiny for commercial speech restrictions. 
The different perspectives of the majority and dissenting 
opinions in IMS Health are not simply subjective differences of 
opinion on how the application of intermediate scrutiny determines 
the constitutionality of the law at issue in that case. Rather, the 
opinions raise issues relevant to intermediate review that are either 
 
 186. Id. at 2653, 2669–72. 
 187. Id. at 2664, 2667 (finding “heightened judicial scrutiny” to be warranted, stating that it 
was subjecting the restriction to Central Hudson analysis but not undertaking traditional Central 
Hudson analysis, and referencing core speech cases throughout); see also Mello & Messing, 
supra note 4, at 1250 (“The term ‘heightened scrutiny’ is critical and pointedly ambiguous. It 
might be a mere synonym for the midlevel scrutiny applied under the Central Hudson test—but it 
might mean far more.”). 
 188. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189. See supra note 4. Compare IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2653 (holding that a Vermont 
statute involving commercial speech violated the First Amendment by applying the intermediate 
scrutiny test developed in Central Hudson, but also mentioning core speech cases throughout the 
majority opinion), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 528–34 (1996) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Central Hudson test should have been applied in the 
majority’s First Amendment analysis); compare IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–85 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Vermont statute should have been analyzed using the rational basis 
test or otherwise upheld under intermediate scrutiny), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 
521 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1997) (holding that state requirements that California fruit growers 
contribute to advertising expenses were an economic regulation that could not be afforded 
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test).  
 190. Outterson, supra note 45, at e31(1) (“Vermont’s statute had a fatal self-inflicted wound. 
By prominently announcing that the state intended to tip the balance in the ‘marketplace for 
ideas’ against drug companies, the law dug itself into a constitutional hole: state interference with 
that marketplace was likely to provoke the ire of a majority of the Supreme Court.”). 
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missing from the Central Hudson test or need further explanation to 
clarify the test going forward.
191
 Outstanding issues remain regarding 
how content-based and speaker-based distinctions factor into the 
commercial speech doctrine and how and whether the commercial 
speech doctrine will be regarded in the future. 
1.  How Do Content-Based Distinctions 
 Factor into the Analysis? 
Several Justices have stated that all content-based restrictions of 
speech, including commercial speech, should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.
192
 The majority in IMS Health found that the law was 
content-based because it forbade the sale of information “subject to 
exceptions based in large part on the content of a purchaser’s speech. 
For example, those who wish to engage in certain ‘educational 
communications’ may purchase the information. The measure then 
bars any disclosure when recipient speakers will use the information 
for marketing.”
193
 The law did restrict the use of information for 
commercial speech purposes, but this is not necessarily an 
outstanding fact.
194
 The dissent found that regulatory programs, such 
as the one at issue, “necessarily draw distinctions on the basis of 
content” and used as an example electricity regulators who “oversee 
company statements, pronouncements, and proposals, but only about 
electricity.”
195
 
 
 191. Post, supra note 19, at 54–55 (“By settling quickly and easily into a test whose bland 
provisions were indifferent to a disciplined account of the constitutional value of commercial 
speech, the doctrine has allowed fundamental differences of perspective to fester and increase. 
These differences now threaten to explode the doctrine entirely.”). 
 192. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 577 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Whatever power the [s]tate may have to regulate commercial speech, it may not use that power 
to limit the content of commercial speech . . . ‘for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair 
bargaining process.’ Such content-discriminatory regulation—like all other content-based 
regulation of speech—must be subjected to strict scrutiny.” (partially quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 
U.S. at 501)); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496–97 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“I see no reason why the fact that such information is disseminated on the labels of 
respondent’s products should diminish that constitutional protection. On the contrary, the statute 
at issue here should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other content-based 
abridgment of protected speech.”). 
 193. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (citation omitted). 
 194. Id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. (“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment 
protection, . . . it must be distinguished by its content.” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976))). 
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The majority’s problem with the content-based regulation was 
that the government failed to present a “neutral justification” for its 
content-based restriction.
196
 However, concerns over content 
neutrality are traditionally relevant in core speech cases only
197
 and 
have not seriously been questioned in the commercial speech context 
because “most regulations of commercial speech are content 
based.”
198
 
Commercial speech is and has historically been identified by 
and regulated according to its content. Commercial speech is by its 
very definition content-based: speech that “propose[s] a commercial 
transaction”
199
 and “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.”
200
 In Central Hudson, the 
Court explained that outside the commercial speech context, “the 
First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of the 
message” but that the features that distinguish commercial speech 
“permit regulation of its content.”
201
 
The Court upheld a commercial speech restriction in Florida 
Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
202
 that was decidedly content- (and speaker-) 
based.
203
 The law at issue restricted communication based on the 
 
 196. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (“The Court has noted, for example, that ‘a State may 
choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . . 
is in its view greater there’ . . . . Here, however, Vermont has not shown that its law has a neutral 
justification.” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992))). 
 197. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 2738 (2011); IMS 
Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court reaches its conclusion through the 
use of important First Amendment categories—‘content-based,’ ‘speaker-based,’ and ‘neutral’—
but without taking full account of the regulatory context, the nature of the speech effects, the 
values these First Amendment categories seek to promote, and prior precedent.”); United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–13 (2000). 
 198. Post, supra note 19, at 49 n.222, 56 n.243 (“[T]he distinction between content-neutral 
and content-based regulations is best interpreted as expressing understandings of specific 
government purposes deemed impermissible within public discourse. It is therefore of no small 
significance that the distinction has virtually no application within the domain of commercial 
speech, where most regulation is content based.” “[M]ost regulations of commercial speech are 
content based. The constitutionality of such regulations would present significant problems if 
commercial speech were conceptualized as a form of public discourse.” (citation omitted)). 
 199. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. 
 200. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 201. Id. at 564 n.6. 
 202. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 203. Id. at 620 (1995) (upholding a rule that a “lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to 
be sent, . . . a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining 
professional employment if: (A) the written communication concerns an action for personal 
injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to 
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subject matter, or content, of the speaker’s letter.
204
 In IMS Health 
the Court conflated core and commercial speech concepts, forging a 
dangerous path for the commercial speech doctrine. Content-based 
core speech distinctions are subject to strict scrutiny,
205
 so it should 
follow that content-based commercial speech distinctions are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny. Such was the case in Went For It. However, 
IMS Health makes it unclear whether this distinction remains, 
threatening the future of the commercial speech doctrine in general 
and the application of intermediate scrutiny specifically. 
2.  How Do Speaker-Based Distinctions 
Factor into the Analysis? 
In IMS Health, the majority also found improper the Vermont 
law’s speaker-based distinction because it “disfavor[ed] specific 
speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”
206
 Conversely, the 
dissent explained that, in the context of regulatory programs, it is not 
“unusual for particular rules to be ‘speaker-based,’ affecting only a 
class of entities, namely, the regulated firms.”
207
 Relying on energy 
regulators as an example, the dissent went on to explain that the 
regulator “might require the manufacturers of home appliances to 
publicize ways to reduce energy consumption, while exempting 
producers of industrial equipment.”
208
 
Previously the Court had found that commercial speech-based 
regulations may deliberately address only problematic speakers. In 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, decided prior to Central Hudson, 
the Court analyzed a state-authorized prohibition on lawyers who 
engage in direct, in-person solicitation of prospective clients and 
found that such a restriction on commercial speech survived First 
Amendment scrutiny.
209
 Conversely, in Edenfield v. Fane,
210
 the 
 
whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster 
occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication”). 
 204. Compare Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (upholding a content-based commercial speech 
restriction prohibiting attorneys from soliciting accident and disaster victims), with Bates v. State 
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down a content-based commercial speech restriction 
applied to attorneys regarding advertising prices for services). 
 205. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
 206. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011). 
 207. Id. at 2678 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
 210. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
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Court analyzed a state law prohibiting certified public accountants 
from in-person, direct solicitation of prospective clients and found 
that the restriction on commercial speech violated the First 
Amendment.
211
 The primary difference between the two cases was 
the identity of the speaker: “Because ‘the distinctions, historical and 
functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite 
different factors,’ the constitutionality of a ban on personal 
solicitation will depend upon the identity of the parties and the 
precise circumstances of the solicitation.”
212
 
Post-Central Hudson cases have confirmed the holding in 
Ohralik and have made it clear that the case “depended upon certain 
‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers.’”
213
 It was 
precisely the distinction between the speakers that made the speech 
at issue either problematic and amenable to restriction or 
constitutionally protected and not amenable to restriction. 
Intermediate scrutiny allows the government to narrowly tailor 
restrictions to address the source of the problem without implicating 
speech that is not part of the problem.
214
 Such a distinction would be 
unconstitutional in the realm of core speech (e.g., nurses, but not 
chefs, can engage in political debate). It is unclear why the 
distinction is permissible in the context of regulating lawyers versus 
accountants, but not in the context of regulating pharmaceutical 
manufacturers versus educators. These distinctions need to be 
fleshed out in future commercial speech cases. The majority in IMS 
Health retreated from precedent that established the commercial 
speech doctrine without explicitly explaining whether it intended to 
amend or otherwise overhaul the doctrine. 
 
 211. Id. at 763. 
 212. Id. at 774 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976)). 
 213. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)); see 
also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida Bar Rules prohibiting 
personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and relatives for 
thirty days after an accident or disaster); cf. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (“Vermont’s law thus 
has the effect of preventing detailers—and only detailers—from communicating with physicians 
in an effective and informative manner.”). 
 214. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
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3.  The Pivotal Prongs  
of Central Hudson 
In order to ground the majority opinion in IMS Health in the 
commercial speech doctrine, one must trust that the majority found 
that the law failed Central Hudson analysis. This would be the case 
because the Vermont law did not allow speakers to use the 
commercial information for marketing purposes, thereby 
unconstitutionally restricting commercial speech. According to the 
dissent, however, the law restricted the use of information gathered 
pursuant to a regulatory mandate and “threaten[ed] only modest 
harm to commercial speech.”
215
 The dissent would have subjected 
the law to rational basis review, but found that it should have been 
sustained under Central Hudson nonetheless.
216
 
IMS Health, of course, is the most recent Supreme Court case 
where the majority ostensibly applied Central Hudson to the 
regulation at issue. The case brings to the forefront some questions 
about the application of the third and fourth prongs to speech 
restrictions and highlights the evolution of the commercial speech 
doctrine since its inception.
217
 
The second prong seems to capture the interests at stake under 
Central Hudson and has been the most straightforward part of the 
inquiry.
218
 Regulated speakers rarely challenge the government’s 
interest, and the government has been able to successfully proffer an 
 
 215. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2680 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 387–88 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not deny that the statute 
restricts the circulation of some truthful information. It prevents a pharmacist from including in 
an advertisement the information that ‘this pharmacy will compound Drug X.’ Nonetheless, this 
Court has not previously held that commercial advertising restrictions automatically violate the 
First Amendment. Rather, the Court has applied a more flexible test. It has examined the 
restriction’s proportionality, the relation between restriction and objective, the fit between ends 
and means. In doing so, the Court has asked whether the regulation of commercial speech 
‘directly advances’ a ‘substantial’ governmental objective and whether it is ‘more extensive than 
is necessary’ to achieve those ends.”). 
 216. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2684 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I consequently conclude that, 
even if we apply an ‘intermediate’ test such as that in Central Hudson, this statute is 
constitutional.”). 
 217. Thank you to Tuongvy Le for her superb analysis of prongs three and four of the Central 
Hudson test in, Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Seth T. Mermin & Tuongvy Le, Constitutional Barriers to 
Legislating Restrictions on Food Marketing to Children: The Aftermath of Lorillard v. Reilly 
(2008) (unpublished report) (on file with Author) (report to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
(RWJF) funded by a grant from the RWJF to National Policy and Legal Analysis Network to 
Prevent Childhood Obesity (NPLAN) to the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity). 
 218. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
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interest that the Court agrees is substantial.
219
 States have satisfied 
the second prong by asserting interests similar to the interests at issue 
in IMS Health,
220
 such as protecting the health, safety, and welfare of 
citizenry,
221
 protecting privacy,
222
 and preventing commercial 
exploitation.
223
 In Went For It, the state proffered all of these 
interests, and the Court upheld the law.
224
 Since Went For It, several 
Justices have stated that the government may not prohibit truthful 
commercial speech “for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a 
fair bargaining process.”
225
 This position conflicts with the language 
of the second prong by holding that the state’s interest in the 
preservation of a fair bargaining process is the only legitimate reason 
to regulate commercial speech. The Central Hudson test imposes no 
such limitation;
226
 however, it might be that this is the only interest 
that will ultimately survive the Court’s review in the future. 
The majority’s departure from methodically applying Central 
Hudson in IMS Health leaves all prongs open to question. If Central 
Hudson is still relevant, the third and fourth prongs have proven the 
most crucial in determining the constitutionality of commercial 
speech restrictions. Both have evolved throughout the years, 
becoming increasingly difficult to pass.
227
 
 
 219. But see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483–86 (1995) (rejecting the state’s 
asserted interest in facilitating state efforts to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-First 
Amendment, but accepting the alternative interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens). 
 220. The IMS Health Court reiterated the importance of protecting privacy and found that the 
government’s “stated policy goals” of lowering the costs of medical services and promoting 
public health “[might] be proper,” but that the law “[did] not advance them in a permissible way.” 
IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2670, 2672. 
 221. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 485 (finding that the Government has a significant interest in 
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“With respect to the second step [of Central Hudson], none of the 
petitioners contests the importance of the State’s interest in preventing the use of tobacco 
products by minors.”). 
 222. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624–25 (1995). 
 223. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (“The Court of Appeals 
also held, and we agree, that the governmental interests asserted in support of the resolution are 
substantial: promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere on SUNY’s campuses, 
promoting safety and security, preventing commercial exploitation of students, and preserving 
residential tranquility.”). 
 224. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 635. 
 225. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996)). 
 226. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 227. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375–76 (2002); Lorillard, 533 
U.S. at 564–65. 
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a.  Prong three 
The third inquiry under Central Hudson asks “whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”
228
 
In practice, this analysis translates into a review of the evidentiary 
record to determine whether the governing body compiled enough 
evidentiary support to show that the speech restriction directly and 
materially advances the proffered interest.
229
 The dissent in IMS 
Health explicitly addressed this prong and found that “Vermont 
compiled a substantial legislative record” to lead the “legislature to 
conclude that the statute ‘directly advance[d]’ each of these 
objectives.”
230
 The majority did not address the evidentiary record 
but rather found that because evidence existed that was contrary to 
the state’s purpose in passing the law, such evidence effectively 
nullified the weight of evidence presented.
231
 The majority relied on 
the views of “some” doctors, as opposed to the dissent, which relied 
on the legislative record at large.
232
 
This begs the question of how much evidence is truly required to 
satisfy the third prong of the analysis.
233
 In several cases the Court 
asserted that it does not require the government to provide “empirical 
data . . . accompanied by a surfeit of background information” to 
prove that a commercial speech restriction will alleviate the 
government’s articulated harm to a material degree.
234
 However, the 
Court actually does require substantial evidence to pass prong three, 
and the government has passed this prong only by offering empirical 
data and background information.
235
 
 
 228. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 555. 
 229. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). 
 230. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2682 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 2671 (majority opinion) (“The defect in Vermont’s law is made clear by the fact 
that many listeners find detailing instructive. Indeed the record demonstrates that some Vermont 
doctors view targeted detailing based on prescriber-identifying information as ‘very helpful’ 
because it allows detailers to shape their messages to each doctor’s practice.”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. The Supreme Court deferred to the legislature’s judgment of the efficacy of a given 
restriction on speech in Posadas de P.R. Associates. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 
342–43 (1986) but overruled that aspect of its decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996), stating that the majority in Posadas “clearly erred in concluding that it 
was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.” 
 234. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (providing that Massachusetts must demonstrate actual harm if 
it seeks to sustain a restriction on the labeling of tobacco products). 
 235. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 558 (holding that the government passed prong three by 
submitting studies by the Food and Drug Administration, Surgeon General, and the Institute of 
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It is unlikely that any amount of evidence would have swayed 
the majority in IMS Health that the statute at issue passed prong three 
because of the perceived deficiencies bordering on core speech 
concerns. But it is disconcerting for future government regulations 
that the opinions of “some” doctors were enough to discount the rest 
of the legislative record compiled by the state.
236
 What is clear is that 
substantial evidence must be compiled, but whether this will matter 
in the long run likely depends on the other aspects of the commercial 
speech restriction in question. 
b.  Prong four 
Prong four has proven to be the most difficult to pass. Under this 
inquiry, the Court seeks to determine whether the speech restriction 
“is not more extensive than is necessary” to serve the government’s 
interest.
237
 Here, the Court analyzes whether the scope of the 
restriction is “in proportion to the interest served” and 
simultaneously requires that the government consider “less-
burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech.”
238
 
The Court has said that the “‘fit’ between . . . ends and . . . means” 
must be “reasonable”;
239
 however, it seems clear that more than a 
reasonable relationship must exist under prong four. 
The majority in IMS Health found that the statute in question 
was not “coherent” enough, meaning that it was not narrowly 
tailored, and that the government did not adequately consider 
alternatives to the speech restriction.
240
 The majority suggested that 
doctors could deal with the issue themselves (by closing the office 
door to detailers) and found that the state offered “no explanation 
why remedies other than content-based rules would be 
 
Medicine); Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626–27 (“The [Florida] Bar submitted a 106-page summary 
of its 2-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation” including both statistical and anecdotal 
data, surveys, and complaints. “The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its 
breadth and detail.”); cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 US 761, 771 (1993) (stating that the regulation 
failed because the government presented “no studies that suggest personal solicitation of 
prospective business clients by CPA’s creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or 
compromised independence that the Board claims to fear”). 
 236. See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2669. 
 237. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 238. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 417 n.13 (1993); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
 239. Id. 
 240. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2668. 
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inadequate.”
241
 The dissent disagreed crucially on this point, finding 
that there was no “similarly effective ‘more limited restriction.’”
242
 
The dissent found that the alternatives suggested by the majority and 
the respondents were not “equally effective” and would continue to 
burden public health and privacy.
243
 
Analysis under prong four has progressively provided stricter 
protection for commercial speech.
244
 The very existence of 
alternatives has increasingly become a determining factor under 
prong four, which is problematic since some alternative option to any 
proposed regulation will likely always exist. The question remains 
unclear on how effective an alternative must be to be considered a 
valid alternative. 
In Thompson, the Court was divided over appropriate 
alternatives under prong four. The majority found that there were 
several non-speech-related means of accomplishing the 
government’s objective and the government failed to explain why the 
means would be “insufficient” to advance the purported interest.
245
 
The dissent contended, however, that that the alternatives would not 
sufficiently accomplish the government’s safety objectives.
246
 In 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
247
 the plurality found that the 
speech restriction failed prong four because the non-speech-related 
alternatives “would be more likely to achieve the State’s goal.”
248
 
The Court has moved from debating the efficacy of the 
alternatives presented to simply noting the existence of alternatives. 
Now, the extent to which efficacy even matters is unclear. IMS 
 
 241. Id. at 2669–70 (“Physicians can, and often do, simply decline to meet with detailers, 
including detailers who use prescriber-identifying information. Doctors who wish to forgo 
detailing altogether are free to give ‘No Solicitation’ or ‘No Detailing’ instructions to their office 
managers or to receptionists at their places of work.” (citation omitted)). 
 242. Id. at 2683. 
 243. Id. at 2683–84. 
 244. Robert Post, Prescribing Records and the First Amendment—New Hampshire’s Data-
Mining Statute, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745, 747 (2009) (“This last requirement is so arbitrary 
that it constitutes an open invitation for judges to bring political prejudices to bear in resolving 
cases. Antiregulatory judges will tend to strike down statutes on the basis of this requirement; 
proregulatory judges will tend to uphold them.”). 
 245. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002). 
 246. Id. at 385–86. 
 247. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 248. Id. at 507 (stating that the regulation prohibiting advertisement of liquor prices failed 
prong four because “alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on 
speech would be more likely to achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance” (emphasis 
added)). 
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Health followed the Court’s directive in Thompson that if “the First 
Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be 
a last—not first—resort.”
249
 One must now ask whether there will 
ever not be a non-speech way to fulfill the government’s purpose. 
4.  A Future for  
Commercial Regulations? 
The ability of the government to pass Central Hudson may be a 
thing of the past. The law in Went For It was content- and speaker-
based, but the majority found that it passed Central Hudson.
250
 It is 
unclear whether Went For It represents the only type of commercial 
speech restriction that the government may avail or whether it is an 
outlier because attorney advertising generally has been subject to 
different standards than advertising for other products and 
services.
251
 
The law at issue in Went For It was upheld largely because it 
left open a significant number of alternative channels of 
communication.
252
 Disregarding the fact that the law upheld in Went 
For It was content- and speaker-based, it regulated speech in a 
manner akin to a time, place, and manner restriction because it 
allowed attorneys to undertake the prohibited communication after a 
short period of time. On aspect of the law at issue in Lorillard might 
be similarly considered, in that it prohibited tobacco advertising on 
billboards within a one-thousand-foot radius of a school or 
playground.
253
 However, the Court found that this was not narrowly 
tailored so that the remaining locations available for billboards were 
not meaningful alternative channels for communication.
254
 One has 
 
 249. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373. 
 250. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). The Court upheld a restriction on in-
person solicitation by attorneys in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978), but 
decided that case prior to Central Hudson. 
 251. In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 199 (N.J. 1986) (“We do not believe that the 
Constitution requires that the rules governing attorney advertising be the same as those applicable 
to beer, automobiles, or casino hotels.”); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626, 677 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The Court’s commercial speech 
decisions have repeatedly acknowledged that the differences between professional services and 
other advertised products may justify distinctive state regulation.”). 
 252. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502 (“[L]ast Term we upheld a 30-day prohibition against a 
certain form of legal solicitation largely because it left so many channels of communication open 
to Florida lawyers.”). 
 253. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561–62 (2001). 
 254. Id. at 563. 
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to wonder if a five-hundred-foot radius would have sufficed in 2001, 
or if one hundred feet would have passed in 2011. 
Perhaps even more worrisome than whether a commercial 
speech restriction will ever survive intermediate review is that we 
might be seeing an erosion of the commercial speech doctrine 
without any serious consideration of its consequences. At first blush, 
one could blame the holding in IMS Health on a poorly drafted 
section of the Vermont statute’s legislative findings.
255
 However, 
because the case decided a circuit split and overruled the First 
Circuit’s finding that the Maine version of the law without the 
problematic language was constitutional,
256
 this case may 
disconcertingly mark a new line of jurisprudence whereby economic 
regulations that tangentially implicate speech are now subject to 
some “heightened” form of First Amendment scrutiny.
257
 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in IMS Health cautioned: 
The Court reaches its conclusion through the use of 
important First Amendment categories—“content-based,” 
“speaker-based,” and “neutral”—but without taking full 
account of the regulatory context, the nature of the speech 
effects, the values these First Amendment categories seek to 
promote, and prior precedent. At best the Court opens a 
Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges to many 
ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally 
affect a commercial message. At worst, it reawakens 
Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for 
 
 255. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (“When it enacted § 4631(d), the 
Vermont Legislature found that the ‘marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is 
frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in expensive pharmaceutical marketing 
campaigns to doctors.’ ‘The goals of marketing programs,’ the legislature said, ‘are often in 
conflict with the goals of the state.’ The text of § 4631(d), associated legislative findings, and the 
record developed in the District Court establish that Vermont enacted its law for this end.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 256. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated, IMS Health Inc. v. 
Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011). 
 257. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2664; id. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, given the 
sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon commercial messages, the Court’s vision 
of its reviewing task threatens to return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized 
legislation for its interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power was much 
abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual 
jurists.”). 
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democratic decision-making where ordinary economic 
regulation is at issue.
258
 
IMS Health’s perplexing and disordered majority opinion, 
confusingly interspersing core and commercial speech case law, 
leaves unclear not only the status of Central Hudson, but also the 
state of basic regulations that may tangentially implicate speech. 
Since precedent seems to be of little value in the commercial speech 
context, one can only hope that a future Supreme Court confines the 
breadth of the holding to one of poorly drafted legislative intent 
mistakenly implicating speech in an otherwise valid commercial 
regulation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
No valid justification for departing from intermediate scrutiny 
has been raised by Justices or parties in First Amendment cases. 
Whatever perceived difficulty there is in applying this standard can 
be rectified by the Court’s continued clarification through subsequent 
cases. The significant difference between core and commercial 
speech cannot be negated by simply requiring an identical 
constitutional analysis to apply to both. There is no standard First 
Amendment test applied to all core speech or all commercial speech. 
Courts must necessarily decide many questions about the speech 
before they can apply the appropriate test. 
Commercial speech is fundamentally different from core speech. 
Commercial communication is subject to abuse; the possibility of 
deception is always at issue because the commercial speaker always 
has more information about his products and services than the 
listener, and it would be impossible in many instances for the listener 
to verify the accuracy of commercial communications. The 
government’s ability to require factual commercial disclosures and to 
restrict false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech must be 
maintained to support a well functioning, efficient, and transparent 
free market economy. Requiring the same protection for commercial 
 
 258. Id. at 2685 (citations omitted); see also Post, supra note 244, at 746–47 (“Commercial-
speech doctrine has since evolved into a disturbingly effective vehicle for invalidating otherwise 
unexceptional regulations of commerce . . . . It seems apparent that if First Amendment coverage 
is indiscriminately applied to all channels of data transmission [such as in the case of Sorrell v. 
IMS Health], and if the Central Hudson test is used to determine the First Amendment protection 
accorded such channels, we will face an increasingly capricious constitutional regime in which 
regulations will be constantly challenged and frequently invalidated.”). 
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and core speech ignores the intricacies within First Amendment 
jurisprudence and the constitutional values underlying the protection 
of each. Even worse, subjecting commercial regulations that 
tangentially implicate speech to First Amendment scrutiny threatens 
to destroy the regulatory system firmly established in the United 
States. The Court should maintain the current distinctions between 
commercial and core speech and reject all future opportunities to 
overhaul the commercial speech doctrine. 
 
